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THINKING ABOUT ELEPHANTS:
ADMONITIONS, EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH AND LEGAL POLICY
J. Alexander Tanford*
Abstract
When prejudicial evidence is erroneously introduced at trial, the law
traditionally has required judges to admonish jurors to disregard or limit
their use of it. This policy is explicitly based on the assumption that
jurors follow such instructions. However, jury behavior research dem-
onstrates that the assumption is wrong - admonitions are ineffective.
This article examines whether the empirical research has had any effect
on legal policy. General theories on the interaction between social science
and law predict that the admonitions rule is a good candidate for reform.
However, comparative analysis of samples of cases from 1958 and 1988
reveals no significant changes in judicial behavior. Apparently, the
research on admonitions has produced no legal change for a reason not
generally considered an important variable in the law and society liter-
ature - because the research failed to demonstrate that any other
procedure would be more effective.
[Judges] rely on the old 'ritualistic admonition' to purge the record.
The futility of that sort of exorcism is notorious .... [I]t is like the
Mark Twain story of the little boy who was told to stand in a corner
and not think of a white elephant.
- Jerome Frank, dissenting in
United States v. Leviton.1
Trials are often infected with prejudicial evidence. Judges traditionally
have relied on ritualistic admonitions to "cure" the problem, solemnly
instructing jurors to disregard or limit their use of potentially inflammatory
information. Most courts have assumed that jurors are capable of
following such instructions, at least to some extent.
* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University - Bloomington.
J.D., LL.M., Duke Law School. The data upon which this Article is based were originally presented
at the 1989 Law and Society Association meetings, the 1990 Conference of the American Psy-
chology-Law Society and at faculty workshops at Indiana University and the University of Iowa.
I am indebted to all those who attended and made suggestions. Robin Stryker provided valuable
criticisms on all aspects of the paper, and Robert N. Parker provided methodological assistance
in drawing and analyzing the samples. The support of the CIC Exchange Scholar Program, Bryant
Garth, and the Center for the Study of Law and Society at Indiana University, is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. 193 F.2d 848, 865 (2d Cir. 1951).
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Empirical research on jury behavior demonstrates that this premise
is false. Jurors are no better at disregarding prejudicial evidence than a
child told not to think about elephants. This social science finding was
first published over thirty years ago and has been widely disseminated
to the legal community. The logical implication of these data is that the
law of admonitions should be changed. However, comparative analysis
of judicial opinions from 1958 and 1988 reveals that no significant legal
change has occurred. Why not?
This article explores one facet of the relationship between social
science and law: the conditions under which empirical research leads to
change in the law. According to conventional theory, the law of
admonitions should have been a prime candidate for science-based law
reform. But despite thirty years of psychological research criticizing
admonitions, no change has occurred. This suggests there must be
another condition necessary for social science to affect law reform that
has not previously been considered important. Comparing the failure of
the admonition research to the success of the eyewitness research reveals
one major difference: the literature on admonitions demonstrates that
they are ineffective, but fails to show that any other procedure is any
better. Thus, it appears that purely "negative" social science does not
lead to law reform, even when all other important conditions seem
satisfied.
Part One of this article summarizes existing theory on the conditions
under which social science is likely to affect legal change. Part Two
synthesizes the law and psychology of admonitions, and shows that this
area of law is a good candidate for law reform according to conventional
theory. Part Three compares samples of judicial opinions concerning
admonitions from 1958 and 1988" using five variables that measure
judicial behavior and finds that no statistically significant changes have
occurred. Part Four asserts that the failure of this social research to
lead to law reform occurred because the literature did not demonstrate
that any other procedure would be more effective. Finally, Part Five
suggests that an alternative method for handling prejudicial evidence
exists that would be more effective than admonishing jurors not to think
about elephants.
I. Social Science and Law Reform
One recurring theme in the law and social science literature concerns
conditions under which empirical research will play a role in law reform.
From even casual observation, it is apparent that social science sometimes
affects law and sometimes does not. Social science was cited in the
famous footnote eleven in Brown v. Board of Education2 in support of
one of the most sweeping changes of law in this century. Research by
2. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954).
[Vol. 60, No. 4
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Elizabeth Loftus,' Gary Wells, 4 and other prominent psychologists on
the unreliability of eyewitness identifications is having a significant effect
on the way courts handle eyewitness testimony.5 On the other hand,
research demonstrating that death qualification in capital cases produces
conviction-prone juries has been presented to many courts but produced
no change in the law .6 When the data were presented to the Supreme
Court in Lockhart v. McCree,7 the majority disparaged it and reiterated
their faith in existing death penalty procedures.
A number of theories have been propounded to explain conditions
under which appellate courts will incorporate social science into legal
policy. Prevailing theory addresses three issues: the minimal conditions
necessary for social science to have any effect on legal policy, the
maximum impact social science can have in the law reform process, and
the factors that determine the extent to which social science will influence
courts within this range.
Four threshold conditions are said to be necessary for empirical
research to have any chance of motivating legal change. First, the
research must appear to be relevant. Ruback and Innes assert that judges
will view research as relevant only if it uses a realistic setting, investigates
aspects of law that could actually be changed, and measures results in
terms judges can understand, such as conviction rates rather than seven-
point attitude scales. 8 Second, the research must be accessible to lawyers.
Most writers assert that accessibility requires publication in law journals
rather than social science journals, 9 although other forms of communi-
cation, such as through judicial center conferences, may also suffice.
Accessibility also means comprehensibility - avoiding statistical form
and scientific jargon. 10 Third, time must pass. Hafemeister and Melton
report that nonlegal materials generally are not cited by courts until they
3. E.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
4. E.g., Gary L. Wells, The Eyewitness, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE, 43-66 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Gary L. Wells et al.,
Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identifications, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
440 (1979).
5. E.g., State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); see also ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS &
JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 280, 322 (1987) (summarizing state
of the law).
6. See William C. Thompson, Death Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart
v. McCree, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 191-94 (1989).
7. 476 U.S. 162 (1986); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (statistical study
demonstrating that death penalty operated in racially discriminatory manner rejected as irrelevant
to death penalty law).
8. R. Barry Ruback & Christopher A. Innes, The Relevance and Irrelevance of Psychological
Research: the Example of Prison Crowding, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 683, 683-84 (1988).
9. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Gary Melton, The Impact of Social Science Research on the
Judiciary, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH, 49-50 (G. Melton
ed., 1987); Charles R. Tremper, Sanguinity and Disillusionment Where Law Meets Social Science,
II L. & HUM. BEHAV. 267, 272 (1987).
10. Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron, THE UsE/NoNuSE/MIsusE OF APPLIED SOCIAL
RESEARCH IN THE COURTS 15 (1980) (remarks of Paul L. Rosen); id. at 44 (remarks of Adam
Yarmolinsky); id. at 120 (remarks of Bernard Grofman and Howard Scarrow); id. at 154 (remarks
of Charles H. Baron).
1992]
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are at least five years old." Fourth, the area of law must not already
be dominated by clear ideological divisions. If the law has already become
embroiled in a political debate, such as abortion, gun control, and the
death penalty, social science is not likely to play a role in setting legal
policy.' 2
Even if empirical research meets these minimal criteria, it may not
significantly influence law. The extent to which courts are likely to use
social science depends on additional factors. Social science will have a
relatively greater impact under the following conditions: 1) the social
science supports judges' intuitive assumptions; 3 2) the citation of em-
pirical research would help legitimate judicial decisions reached on po-
litical, practical, or common sense grounds; 4 3) the research is of high
quality;'" 4) the literature has previously been used as authority in other
judicial opinions; 16 and 5) the data have penetrated the culture of the
educated elite through the mass media or law school classes, producing
a "ripple effect" as it becomes better known.17
Other conditions decrease the likelihood that the courts will rely on
social science. The heavier the concentration of statistics, the less likely
that research will be used. 18 The more social science contradicts religious
faith or the sentiments essential to other social institutions, the less likely
that it will influence legal policy.' 9 If the results of scientific research
fail to support the policy predilections of lawmakers or contradict legal
precedent, they are unlikely to have much influence. 20 If judges believe
11. Hafemeister & Melton, supra note 9, at 43-44.
12. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal Policy,
in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA, 66 (G. Hazard ed., 1968); Gary Melton, Bringing Psychology
to the Legal System: Opportunities, Obstacles, and Efficacy, 42 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 488, 491 (1987).
13. Gary Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment: A Psycholegal Dilemma, J.
Soc. ISSUES, at 109 (pointing out that Chief Justice Burger cited social science only in support of
his view of the vulnerability of children that had been expressed in prior opinions); see also Saks
& Baron, supra note 10, at 16 (remarks of Stephen L. Wasby).
14. Richard 0. Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences on Law and
Policy, 11 L. & POL'Y 167, 184 (1988); Saks & Baron, supra note 10, at 10 (remarks of Paul L.
Rosen). Social theory holds that in the modern age of technology, courts cannot expect blind
obedience simply because they announce a rule. Rather, they will increasingly have to legitimate
their decisions with the apparent rationality of science. JURGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL
SOCIETY 81-85 (J. Shapiro trans., 1970); Robin S. Stryker, Science, Class, and the Welfare State:
A Class-centered Functional Account, 96 Am. J. Soc. 684, 687-93 (1990).
15. Lempert, supra note 14, at 176.
16. IRWIN A. HOROWITZ & THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW: INTEGRATIONS
AND APPLICATIONS 349-50 (1984). More optimistic writers argue that courts will (or should)
eventually begin to treat social research as one of several sources of authority that guide their
decision-making. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal
Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877, 887-90 (1988).
17. Kalven, supra note 12, at 68-69; Lempert, supra note 14, at 181-84.
18. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 148 (1990); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann,
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense
Attorney's Fallacy, II L. & Hum. BEHAV. 167 (1987) (educated subjects underutilized statistical
information in decision process).
19. ROBERT C. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 254-55 (1973); Tanford, supra note 18,
at 153-54.
20. Lempert, supra note 14, at 184-85; J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts,
[Vol. 60, No. 4
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a change in the legal rule would lead to political disruption, they may
be reluctant to use it. 2'
Under the best of circumstances, there is a maximum limit to the
role social science is likely to play in determining policy. Three primary
structural and institutional factors inherent in the nature of the legal
system (or in individual subsystems) create this ceiling effect. First,
because law is a normative institution, there will always be important
issues of value that cannot be answered by social science. For example,
empirical research can tell us that death-qualifying a jury will result in
more convictions, but cannot answer whether an increase in the convic-
tion rate is good or bad.22 Second, because legal decisions are made by
humans, they will reflect the general population's tendency to trust
intuition over science. 23 Third, because legal policy is set by hundreds
of individual judges, some policy-level decisions will inevitably be made
by judges who are hostile to social science. Individual judges may be
conservative and distrust what they perceive as social science's liberal
bias. 24 Some judges may conceive of law as an autonomous discipline
that needs no outside help to answer legal questions. They may fear loss
of power, prestige, and control if they start relying on science. 25 Some
judges simply may not understand the process by which scientists reach
consensus and erroneously decide that the quality and quantity of re-
search is insufficient to support the conclusion on which it is offered. 26
Within these limits, however, the admonition rule looks like a good
candidate for social science-based law reform.
Legislatures and Commissions Following Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. (1991).
21. Thompson, supra note 6, at 202-04.
22. See Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights - the Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6 J. L. & EDUC. 3, 4-6 (1977); Tanford, supra note 18, at 157; see also Craig Haney,
Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual Jurisprudence, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
147, 158-71 (1980) (friction between different perspectives of law and social science is impediment
to change).
23. RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 55-56 (1980). see, Michael J. Saks & Robert Kidd, Human Information Processing
and Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 123, 127-31, 149 (1980).
24. PAUL ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 198-99 (1972); Wallace D. Loh,
The Evidence and Trial Procedure: The Law, Social Policy, and Psychological Research, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 13, 36-37 (1985); see also David Bazelon, Veils,
Values and Social Responsibility, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 115-17 (1982) (judges suggest that
social scientists have hidden agendas of social change).
25. Lee Loevinger, Law and Science as Rival Systems, JURIMETRICS J., Dec. 1966, at 63, 70;
Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 761, 762-66; Tanford, supra note 18, at 153-56.
26. Tanford, supra note 18, at 154-55. A good example is the Supreme Court's decision in
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). The American Psychological Association filed an amicus
brief discussing the research demonstrating that death-qualified juries are conviction-prone, con-
cluding that the research satisfied criteria for scientific reliability. Brief for Amicus Curiae American
Psychological Association, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (No. 84-1865). The Court
spent five pages criticizing the quantity and quality of the research. 476 U.S. at 168-72. It is
impossible to say whether the inability of intelligent and well-educated judges to understand social
science is genuine ignorance or contrived disingenuousness.
1992] 649
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II. The Law and Psychology of Admonitions
Judges have long recognized that it is impossible to conduct a
perfect trial. 27 Rules of evidence and procedure will inevitably be broken
and jurors exposed to prejudicial evidence. If new trials were granted
for every error, few cases would ever be brought to conclusion. There-
fore, the rule of law developed which required the trial judge to admonish
jurors to disregard or limit their use of prejudicial evidence, but to
continue the trial. Courts express the hope that these admonitions (often
called "curative instructions") will in fact reduce the prejudicial impact
of improper evidence so that the trial will remain fair. 28
Some admonitions instruct jurors to completely disregard informa-
tion and not consider it for any purpose in arriving at a verdict. A judge
may admonish jurors to disregard evidence to which they should not
have been exposed, such as seeing a defendant in shackles, 29 finding out
that a civil defendant has insurance,30 or hearing a police officer's opinion
that a defendant has been involved in a series of unsolved robberies. 3'
A judge also may admonish the jury to disregard the judge's own
improper conduct32 or an attorney's improper remarks."
Courts traditionally have assumed that if jurors are instructed to
disregard information, they will be able to do so. In Crocklin v. United
States,34 the appeals court found that an instruction to disregard a
prosecutor's remark that the sale of bootleg liquor increased the number
of children killed on highways had been "effective." In State v. Ruyle,35
the court held that an instruction to disregard a witness's testimony that
the defendant had been involved in other crimes had "corrected" the
error. In People v. Schiers,3 6 the court presumed that jurors followed
an instruction to disregard testimony that the defendant had failed a
polygraph test.
Other admonitions instruct jurors to limit their use of information
that is admissible for one purpose but not another.17 For example,
27. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970) ("Being manned by humans, the courts
are not perfect and are bound to make some errors.").
28. See, e.g., Anthony v. United States, 256 F.2d 50, 52-53 (9th Cir. 1958) (jurors "presum-
ably followed" an instruction to limit their use of prior conviction).
29. Bailey v. State, 519 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 (Ind. 1988).
30. Hall v. Ratliff, 312 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958).
31. Martin v. State, 528 N.E.2d 461, 464 (Ind. 1988).
32. Montgomery v. State, 760 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (judge informed jury
about parole laws, then instructed them to disregard the information); see also Jackson v. State,
756 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (judge commented adversely on defendant's evidence and
refused to instruct jury to disregard his expression of opinion; appellate court held that the
admonition would have cured the error).
33. People v. Walker, 765 P.2d 70, 81 (Cal. 1988) (prosecutor insinuated that life sentence
might enable defendant to get out of prison after only a few years; judge instructed jury to
disregard it).
34. 252 F.2d 561, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1958).
35. 318 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Mo. 1958).
36. 324 P.2d 981, 986 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
37. See generally EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 151-52 (3d ed. 1984)
(discussion of concept of limited admissibility).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes
is not admissible to show that a defendant has a tendency to commit
criminal acts, but is admissible to prove his state of mind. Therefore,
in United States v. Cuch,38 the judge admonished the jury that evidence
of previous sexual assaults could not be considered as evidence a defen-
dant committed the act of rape, but could be used as evidence of his
intent. Limiting instructions also may be used if evidence is admissible
against only one defendant among several who are being jointly tried.3 9
Again, the law has traditionally assumed that limiting instructions
are effective. In Anthony v. United States,40 the appeals court found
that the jury "presumably followed" an instruction that evidence of
prior drug crimes could not be considered on the question of whether
the defendant possessed marijuana, but only on the issue of his intent.
In People v. Jackson,41 the court "assumed that the jury heeded [an]
instruction" that evidence of a growing drug problem in the community
was inadmissible on the question of defendant's guilt, but could be
considered as background concerning the police investigation.
In 1959, Dale Broeder published the results of experiments by the
University of Chicago Jury Project demonstrating that admonitions to
disregard evidence may be ineffective. 42 He reported that their subjects
had not followed instructions to disregard evidence that the defendant
was insured. 43 Indeed, the instruction only made things worse. Average
jury verdicts increased from $33,000 to $37,000 when the jury was told
the defendant was insured, but jumped to $46,000 when they were told
to disregard the information."
Over the next twenty-five years, at least five other research teams
reached similar results. Sue, Smith, and CaldwellP demonstrated that
instructions to disregard illegally obtained incriminating evidence were
not only ineffective, but also tended to increase the prejudicial impact
of the evidence. Wolf and Montgomery" showed that admonitions to
disregard evidence did not work, but only tended to aggravate the effect
of the evidence, whether incriminating or exculpatory. Oros and Elman47
38. 842 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 1988).
39. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987); see also United States v. Gordon, 253
F.2d 177, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1958); People v. Duncan, 530 N.E.2d 423, 430 (I1. 1988). But see
Durkin v. Equine Clinics Inc., 546 A.2d 665, 671 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
40. 256 F.2d 50, 53 (9th Cir. 1958).
41. 331 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
42. Dale Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 753-54
(1959); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago
Law School, 24 INs. CouNs. J. 368, 377-78 (1957) (reporting results of same experiment).
43. Broeder, supra note 42, at 754.
44. Id.
45. Stanley Sue et al., Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors:
A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 345, 350-51 (1973).
46. Steven Wolf & D.A. Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial
Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 205,
213-16 (1977).
47. Cheryl Oros & Donald Elman, Impact of Judge's Instructions Upon Jurors' Decisions:
the Cautionary Charge in Rape Trials, 10 REP. RES. IN Soc. PSYCH. 28, 32 (1979).
19921
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found that instructing jurors to disregard a defendant's negative personal
characteristics resulted in the jury judging the defendant more, not less,
severely. Thompson, Fong and Rosenhan 48 obtained mixed results, find-
ing that instructions to disregard exculpatory evidence were ineffective,
but that instructions to disregard a police officer's personal opinion of
a defendant's guilt had some effect. 49 In only one study did the subjects
follow instructions to disregard evidence. When Cornish and Sealy
admonished subjects to disregard evidence of a defendant's criminal
record, the mock jurors appeared able to follow their instructions to a
limited extent.5 0 However, this experiment used British subjects, so the
results are probably not generalizable to this country.
The empirical research on limiting instructions reaches similar re-
sults. The original finding that limiting instructions may be ineffective
or even make matters worse was made by researchers on the University
of Chicago Jury Project. Harry Kalven and Dale Broeder concluded that
jurors are either unwilling or unable to follow instructions that criminal
record evidence be used only to determine a defendant's credibility and
instead routinely use it for the forbidden purpose of deciding whether
the defendant committed the criminal act."
Over the next twenty-five years, other studies reached similar con-
clusions about the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions. Doob and
Kirschenbaum 5 2 found that evidence of a defendant's prior record for
similar crimes affected subjects' guilt decisions despite an instruction
that they limit their use of the evidence to a determination of the
defendant's credibility. Their experiment was structured so that the
defendant did not supply any important evidence of his own innocence,
so that a reduction in his credibility should not have affected guilt
determinations.53 Hans and Doob54 found similar effects using a single
prior offense. Wissler and Saks55 found that when criminal record
evidence was admitted under a limiting instruction, subjects did not use
it for the proper purpose of assessing credibility, but instead used it for
the improper purpose of determining substantive guilt. Severance and
48. William C. Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 453, 457-58 (1981).
49. Methodological problems cast doubt on the reliability of this finding. Thompson did not
measure the effect of the opinion evidence without an instruction, so they have to assume it would
have had an impact on the jurors' assessment of guilt. Id. Without knowing if a police officer's
opinion of defendant's guilt would affect a jury in the first place, it is difficult to reliably determine
whether an instruction to disregard reduces or aggravates the effect of the evidence.
50. William R. Cornish & A. Philip Sealy, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L.
REV. 208, 222.
5 1. Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J.
763, 777 (1961).
52. Anthony Doob & Hershi M. Kirschenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of
§ 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon the Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88 (1972).
53. Id. at 89-95.
54. Valerie Hans & Anthony Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 242-49 (1975).
55. Roselle Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 37, 41-44 (1985).
[Vol. 60, No. 4
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Loftus56 demonstrated that jurors who had been given limiting instruc-
tions concerning a defendant's prior record showed no more understand-
ing of the concept than those who had not been instructed. Tanford
and Cox" found that limiting instructions concerning criminal record
evidence were also ineffective in civil cases.
Similar results have been obtained in experiments on the effect of
joinder. Limiting instructions appear to be ineffective in preventing
spillover effects from one charge to another, or from one defendant to
another. Horowitz, Bordens, and Feldman 8 demonstrated that if cases
are joined for trial, the likelihood of conviction increases compared to
trying the cases separately, despite limiting instructions to consider
evidence separately. Greene and Loftus"9 found that if trials are joined,
there is a significantly greater likelihood of conviction on each count
than if the counts were tried separately, despite limiting instructions.
Tanford and Penrod 6° also found that joinder increases conviction rates
when charges are similar, and that a limiting instruction has no effect.
Only one experiment found a marginal effect for limiting instructions,
but the psychologists who conducted it doubted the efficacy of the
finding. 61
It is always problematic to generalize results reached in mock-jury
studies to real trials. No simulated trial can replicate all the complexities
of an actual trial. The external validity of mock-jury studies is further
reduced when psychologists overuse college students as subjects, measure
individual jurors' decisions instead of jury verdicts after deliberations,
use guilt-scales and other kinds of measures other than verdicts, and
omit opening statements, closing arguments, and other aspects of the
adversary system. 62 However, the admonition research reaches consistent
results in numerous studies using different simulation methods and a
variety of subjects so that the risks of over-generalization are minimal.
It is safe to say that the research demonstrates that it is far more likely
that admonitions are ineffective than that they work as the courts
intend. 63
56. Lawrence Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Compre-
hend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 L. & Soc'Y REV. 153 (1982).
57. Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting
Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 477, 484 (1988).
58. Irwin A. Horowitz et al., A Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in Severed and Joined
Criminal Trials, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 444, 448-54 (1980).
59. Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 L. & HuM.
BEHAV. 193, 201-04 (1985).
60. Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social Inference Processes in Juror Judgments of
Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 749 (1984).
61. Sarah Tanford et al., Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of
Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 319 (1985).
62. Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Reviewing the Empirical Evidence on Jury Racism: Findings of
Discrimination or Discriminatory Findings?, 69 NEB. L. REv. 230, 243-44 (1990) (summarizing
critical literature); see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171 (1986) (Supreme Court refuses
to consider social science studies because they used simulated instead of actual jurors); Tanford,
supra note 18, at 145-47 (criticizing Lockhart decision).
63. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
19921
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Conventional theory predicts that the admonition rule should be a
good candidate for social science based law reform. All four threshold
conditions, 4 are met. First, the empirical research meets the apparent
relevancy test. The research studies a real problem (juror reactions to
evidence) and a real procedure that could be changed (requiring admo-
nitions). Most of the studies express the results in terms judges can
understand, such as verdict dollar amounts65 and conviction rates. 66
Second, these data are easily accessible to lawyers and judges. They have
been disseminated through law reviews67 and interdisciplinary journals
listed in the Index to Legal Periodicals. 68 The research has been sum-
marized and discussed in non-statistical terms in books readily available
to lawyers 69 and law students. 70 Third, more than enough time has passed
for the research to have been discovered by lawyers. The literature has
been available for over thirty years. 7' Fourth, the propriety of using
admonitions is not the subject of public political debate. As trial pro-
cedures go, their use does not implicate any obvious ideological division.
Civil parties, prosecutors, and criminal defendants may all be helped or
hurt by improper evidence, so all have interests in finding ways to
minimize the prejudicial effect of that evidence. Even on appeal in
criminal cases, where political interests generally favor affirming convic-
tions, 72 neither approving nor disapproving admonitions will necessarily
further that goal. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of admonitions would
sometimes favor defendants' requests for new trials when admonitions
were given 73 and sometimes favor states' assertions of harmless error
when admonitions were not given. 74
In addition, many of the additional factors that increase the extent
to which social science should influence legal change 75 are present. The
data support the intuitive assumptions of a substantial minority of
judges. For example, in one survey, 43% of judges stated that they did
64. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
65. E.g., Broeder, supra note 42, at 753-54 (instructing jurors to disregard insurance caused
their average verdicts to increase from $37,000 to $46,000).
66. E.g., Greene & Loftus, supra note 59, at 201 (guilty verdicts); Hans & Doob, supra note
54, at 242-43 (guilty verdicts after deliberation).
67. See generally Broeder, supra note 42; Cornish & Sealy, supra note 50; Doob & Kirschen-
baum, supra note 52; Hans & Doob, supra note 54; Kalven, supra note 12.
68. See generally Greene & Loftus, supra note 59; Tanford & Cox, supra note 57; Tanford
et al., supra note 61; Wissler & Saks, supra note 55.
69. Martin F. Kaplan, Character Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE 150, 161 (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds., 1985); E. Allen Lind, The Psychology of
Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 13, 29-30 (Norbert L. Kerr &
Robert M. Bray eds., 1982).
70. HOROWITZ & WILLGING, supra note 16, at 123; J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL
PROCESS: LAW TACTICS AND ETHICS 311 (1983).
71. See Broeder, supra note 42; Kalven, supra note 12; Thompson et al., supra note 48 (all
published between 1958 and 1961).
72. See J. Alexander Tanford, Closing Argument Procedure, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 47, 137
n.406 (1986) (concluding approximately 85076 of criminal convictions are affirmed on appeal).
73. E.g., United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 1988).
74. E.g., Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1988).
75. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
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not think jurors could really follow limiting instructions. 76 In some
opinions, judges have expressed doubts about the efficacy of admonitions
and could have used the research to support and legitimate those deci-
sions. 77 Some of the research is of particularly high quality. 78 Many of
the articles describing the data have been cited in judicial opinions. 79
The research has been taught for almost ten years to law students, 80 so
it has had a chance to percolate into legal knowledge. Have these data
had any impact on the development of law?
III. Inertia and Change in Judicial Opinions
Admonitions are largely the product of case law. Therefore, to
investigate whether social science research on the ineffectiveness of
admonitions has produced any legal change, appellate court opinions
from 1958 to the present were examined. A computer-assisted search
through the LEXIS database for all cases containing variations of the
terms by which admonitions are known produced 41,158 citations. Close
examination of several samples showed that only about 55% of these
opinions would be relevant. A relevant opinion was one in which an
appellate court reviewed a trial judge's decision to give or withhold an
admonition or which evaluated the seriousness of an underlying eviden-
tiary error after an admonition had been given. These opinions were
reviewed to investigate two related questions: 1) is the empirical research
on the inefficacy of admonitions having any direct effect on appellate
opinions? and 2) if no direct effect is evident, might the research be
having an indirect impact on judicial behavior? Some writers predict
that empirical research will more probably affect law indirectly, as new
knowledge penetrates the culture of the educated elite.8'
76. Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant
With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 215, 218 (1968); see also Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[tihe naive assumption that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing attorneys know
to be unmitigated fiction").
77. E.g., State v. Curry, 436 N.W.2d 371 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (judge admonished jury to
limit use of incriminating hearsay, appellate court reached intuitive conclusion that the instruction
was "inadequate to cure prejudice"); Durkin v. Equine Clinics, Inc., 546 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (joint malpractice trial against veterinarian and clinic in which some evidence admissible
only against doctor; appellate court reached conclusion that an effective limiting instruction was
not possible).
78. See Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 L. &
HuM. BEHAV. 1, 6 (1987) (singling out the study by Tanford & Penrod, supra note 60, as being
of particularly high quality).
79. See, e.g. United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1986); People v. Allen, 420
N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1988) (citing Doob & Kirschenbaum, supra note 52; Hans & Doob, supra note
54; Wissler & Saks, supra note 55; Note, supra 51); State v. Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 13 (N.J. 1987)
(citing Sue et al., supra note 45; Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 46); State v. Burton, 676 P.2d
975 (Wash. 1984) (citing Doob & Kirschenbaum, supra note 52; Hans & Doob, supra note 54;
Thompson, supra note 48).
80. See, e.g., TANFORD, supra note 70, at 311.
81. Carol Weiss, The Diffusion of Social Science Research to Policymakers: An Overview,
in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 71 (G. Melton ed., 1987)
(calling the process "enlightenment through knowledge creep"); see also Kalven, supra note 12,
at 68-69 (social science influences law only after it becomes part of general knowledge of judges).
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A. Direct Effects
To investigate whether the psychology literature was playing a direct
role in judicial decision-making, a computer-assisted LEXIS search of
all relevant opinions was conducted for citations to the juror behavior
studies or use of the terms "empirical data," "empirical research,"
"social science," or "psychology." That search yielded only twenty-
four cases (0.1°%) containing citations to the jury behavior literature.12
Even among these twenty-four appellate opinions, many judges did not
understand, did not accept, or reached decisions inconsistent with the
very empirical research they cited. For example, in Thompson v. United
States,83 an appellate court cited Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of
Balancing and Other Matters4 for its conclusion that jurors cannot
follow limiting instructions, yet held that such instructions generally are
effective. In Clarke v. Vandermeer,85 State v. Honomichl,8 6 and State v.
Burton,87 jury behavior research was discussed and relied on by only a
minority of dissenting judges in decisions that approved the use of
admonitions.
A close reading of a sample of relevant opinions from 1988 revealed
no other references to social science research, and no evidence that the
judges had ever heard of the psycholegal literature. Appellate judges are
still insisting that admonitions are effective in reducing harm caused by
inadmissible evidence, improper argument, and other prejudicial events.
Several cases are typical. 88 In Montgomery v. State,89 the trial judge had
given jurors information that a defendant could get out on parole and
then instructed them to disregard it. Although it would be unconstitu-
tional for the jurors to consider the parole laws in arriving at a verdict, 9°
the appellate court affirmed the conviction, "presum[ing] not only that
the jurors followed the Court's instructions, but that they followed them
to the letter." 9' In State v. Foster,92 a witness had testified that the
82. E.g., United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Horowitz et al., supra
note 58; Tanford et al., supra note 61); People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1988) (citing
Doob & Kirschenbaum, supra note 52; Hans & Doob, supra note 54; Wissler & Saks, supra note
55); Rowe v. Farmer's Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1985) (citing Broeder, supra note 42); State
v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1983) (citing Sue et al., supra note 45; Wolf & Montgomery,
supra note 46).
83. 546 A.2d 414, 424-26 (D.C. 1988).
84. Note, supra note 51.
85. 740 P.2d 921, 931-32 (Wyo. 1987).
86. 410 N.W.2d 544, 553 (S.D. 1987).
87. 676 P.2d 975, 986-87 (Wash. 1984).
88. See also United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 827 n.27 (7th Cir. 1988) (admonitions
ensure there is no prejudice); Mullen v. Princess Anne Vol. Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1134-35 (4th
Cir. 1988) (admonition prevents improper use of evidence); State v. DeGroot, 430 N.W.2d 290,
292-93 (Neb. 1988) (instructions remove damaging effects); People v. Brock, 532 N.Y.S.2d 903,
904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (admonition fully protects defendant).
89. 760 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
90. The instruction had been declared unconstitutional. See Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529,
552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
91. 760 S.W.2d at 327.
92. 755 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
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defendant was involved in other crimes, and the judge admonished the
jurors not to consider that evidence. Although it would be a serious
violation of the rules of evidence for the jurors to consider the defen-
dant's criminal record, the appeals court upheld the conviction, stating
that "the law ...directs (and properly so) that a jury is presumed to
have followed the instructions of the court." 93 In Julius v. Johnson,4
the prosecution had introduced evidence of the defendant's criminal
record. The defense attorney had requested that no limiting instruction
be given for fear it would produce the kind of boomerang effect the
studies found. 9 The appellate judges, however, believed so strongly in
the efficacy of limiting instructions that they held that failure to ask for
one amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 96
B. Indirect Effects
To investigate the possibility of indirect effects, a random sample
of 151 relevant opinions from 1958 was compared to a sample of 154
such cases from 1988. Using a LEXIS search, the total population of
relevant opinions in 1958 was estimated 97 to be 225 cases; for 1988, it
was 1350 cases. The ratio of state to federal cases in each population
was just over 3:1. A two-thirds random sample of 1958 cases produced
151 appellate opinions from nine federal circuits and twenty states. A
one-eighth random sample of the 1988 cases produced 154 appellate
opinions from ten federal circuits and thirty-six states.
All 305 opinions were reviewed to determine the presence or absence
of five variables designed to measure whether judicial behavior was
consistent with the psycholegal literature on admonition ineffectiveness:
1) Does the court invoke the formal cured-error doctrine? The cured-
error doctrine provides that a reviewing court does not have to reverse
a judgment for errors that occurred during trial if the right admonitions
were given. For example, in Gowin v. State,98 a sheriff testified that a
drunk-driving defendant had prior arrests for the same offense. This
evidence was legally inadmissible and would usually require that the
conviction be reversed because of the strong likelihood that the jury
would be affected by it.99 In Gowin, however, the trial judge had
instructed the jury to disregard the evidence, so the appellate court
invoked the cured error doctrine and affirmed the conviction.' °°
2) Does the appellate court reach a result consistent with the jury
behavior research, regardless of whether the result is justified by referring
93. Id. at 849.
94. 840 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1988).
95. Id. at 1539.
96. Id. at 1540-41.
97. 1 estimated population of relevant opinions by multiplying total citations by 0.55.
98. 760 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
99. See Hans & Doob, supra note 54, at 242-43 (prior record for similar offense made
significant difference in number of guilty verdicts); Wissler & Saks, supra note 55, at 41-42 (prior
offense increased conviction rate).
100. 760 S.W.2d at 676.
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to psychology? For example, in Camillo v. State,'0 the prosecutor had
violated the rules of evidence when she tried to prove that an arson
defendant had a prior criminal record. The defendant complained on
appeal that his lawyer had been ineffective because the lawyer had not
requested an admonition.10 2 The court denied the appeal based on its
intuition that the instruction would not have been helpful to the defen-
dant. 103
3) Does the appellate court concede anywhere in the opinion that
admonitions are problematic? For example, in State v. Foster,'°4 the jury
had been improperly told that the defendant had a prior criminal record,
whereupon the trial judge had instructed them to disregard the evidence.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the instruction was not effective. 105
The appellate court "concedes that such a charge often presupposes a
mentality of contortionistic proportions on the part of the fact finder,"
but affirmed the conviction anyway because the instruction was better
than doing nothing.'0
4) Does the appellate court allude in any way to social science,
psychology or empirical research, or show any awareness that research
has been conducted, regardless of whether any specific source is cited?
For example, appellate judges might state their impressions that psy-
chologists had shown admonitions to be ineffective, but be unable to
recall the source.
5) Does the court criticize the practice of giving admonitions on any
basis? There have always been some skeptical judges who believed these
instructions did not work. For example, Justice Jackson, concurring in
Krulewitch v. United States,0 7 wrote that "[tihe naive assumption that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all
practicing attorneys know to be an unmitigated fiction."' 08 In Dunn v.
United States,1 9 the court wrote that "one cannot unring a bell; after
the thrust of the saber it is difficult to say forget the wound; [and] ...
if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can't instruct the jury not
to smell it.'"' 0
Comparing 1958 to 1988 opinions, no statistically significant varia-
tion was found for any of these five dependent measures (see Table).
Despite thirty years of consistent data showing the inefficacy of admo-
101. 757 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
102. Id. at 237.
103. Id. at 239-41.
104. 755 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
105. Id. at 847.
106. Id. at 849; see also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (limiting the
admissibility of separate confessions in joint trials because "there are some contexts in which the
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow [limiting] instructions is so great, ... that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.").
107. 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 453.
109. 307 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1962).
110. Id. at 886.
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nitions, courts continue to approve them and treat them as if they
actually prevented prejudice.
Table
Change in Judicial Use of
Admonitions, 1958-1988
Percentage of Opinions in which
variable appears
Dependent 1958 1988 Change* Significance
variables (n =151) (n = 154) (one-Tailed)
1. Cured error doctrine .762 .766 + .004 NS
not invoked
2. Result consistent .166 .110 - .056 NS
with psychology
3. Recognition that .093 .046 - .047 NS
instructions
problematic
4. Allusion to social .000 .007 + .007 NS
science in any way
5. Criticism of .020 .007 - .013 NS
use of instructions
* For all variables, change was expected in a positive (+) direction.
If the social science literature on the ineffectiveness of admonitions
were percolating into the knowledge of judges, the frequency with which
courts invoke the cured error doctrine should decline. No such change
has occurred. The frequency with which the doctrine was invoked has
remained constant. In the sample of 1958 cases, 23.8%V0 of appellate
courts invoked the cured error doctrine. In the sample of 1988 opinions,
23.4% invoked the doctrine.
If the jury behavior research were having an indirect effect, the
number of judges who feel uneasy about admonitions should increase.
That should result in an increase in the number of cases in which
appellate judges reach results consistent with the empirical research,
regardless of the reasons they articulate. No such change occurred. In
fact, the frequency of consistent results declined by one-third. In the
sample of 1958 opinions, 16.6% of appellate courts reached results
consistent with the subsequent experimental discoveries. In the sample
of 1988 cases, only 11.0% reached results consistent with the literature.
If judges were absorbing anything from the jury behavior research,
the 1988 opinions should contain more concessions that admonitions are
problematic, regardless of the eventual decision. No such increase was
found. In fact, the number of appellate opinions expressing doubts about
the efficacy of admonitions decreased. In the sample of 1958 cases,
9.3% expressed the belief that admonitions were problematic. In the
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1988 sample, only 4.6% contained any such expressions of doubt.
Obviously, none of the 1958 opinions contained any indirect refer-
ence to empirical research because it had not yet been conducted. A
significant number of cases were expected to be found in the 1988 sample
in which appellate judges summarized their impressions, perhaps left
over from law school, that psychologists had demonstrated that admo-
nitions did not always work."' However, only one such case (00.7%)
turned up.
If the knowledge gained from research on admonitions were being
transmitted to judges, one would expect to see an increase in the number
of appellate opinions containing critical or skeptical statements. No such
increase was found. Among the sample of 1958 cases, 2.007o contained
critical comments. In the 1988 sample, only 0.7% contained any criticism
of, or expressed skepticism about, the efficacy of admonitions.
In sum, comparing 1988 appellate opinions to 1958 opinions, across
five dependent measures, suggests that the empirical research on admo-
nitions has had absolutely no effect on judicial behavior. Not a single
variable showed a statistically significant change in a direction consistent
with the psycholegal literature. Although thirty years of empirical re-
search demonstrates the inefficacy of admonitions, judges in 1988 still
rely on them as often, and use them as uncritically, as they did in 1958.
IV. Why No Change? The Problem of Negative Research
According to conventional theory on the interaction between social
science and law, some change in the law of admonitions should have
occurred. It did not. Courts have not relied on the psychology literature
as authority, cited it, or used it to legitimate their decisions. Nor has
the research had any kind of measurable indirect effect on legal policy.
Courts in 1988 seem to be using admonitions exactly as they were thirty
years ago, completely uninfluenced by empirical data.
To understand why the empirical research on admonitions has had
no effect on the law of admonitions, it may be helpful to compare the
nature of the admonition research with the empirical research on eyew-
itnesses. 1 2 The body of psycholegal literature on eyewitness unreliability
is similar to the admonition literature in many ways. The eyewitness
research comes from the same field - social psychology - and even
from some of the same psychologists who studied admonitions." ' The
bulk of the eyewitness literature was published over the same time period
I 1. For example, Harry Kalven predicts that one way social science will have an impact on
the law is by becoming part of the information lawyers learn in law school. Kalven, supra note
12, at 68-69.
112. See generally LOFTUS, supra note 3 (the classic book on the subject).
113. E.g., Greene & Loftus, supra note 59, at 201-04 (limiting instructions in joint trials);
Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May Be Contagious, 4 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 323 (1980) (eyewitness unreliability).
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- the last thirty years."3 4 The eyewitness research also meets the threshold
conditions" 5 of apparent relevancy,"16 accessibility," 7 longevity," 8 and
relative political neutrality. Citations to it appear in appellate opinions." 9
Concerns about possible misidentifications implicate the same basic trial
norms as concerns over possible misuse of prejudicial information. 20
Despite these similarities, the eyewitness research has had a signifi-
cant impact on legal change. Some courts have changed their rules of
evidence to permit expert testimony on the dangers of eyewitness unre-
liability.' 2' Others have modified their practice to require giving caution-
ary instructions. 2 2 No such changes in the law have occurred in response
to the admonition literature. What accounts for the difference?
Of the factors currently thought to affect the interaction between
social science and law, only one could have any significant role in
explaining the difference between the impact of the eyewitness research
and the non-impact of the admonition research: the extent to which it
has penetrated the legal culture. In sheer quantity, the eyewitness research
outweighs the admonition research by a wide margin. The literature on
eyewitnesses comprises over 100 social science articles and a dozen law
review articles. 23 There are barely two dozen social science articles on
admonitions 124 and only a handful of law review pieces.2 5 More articles
114. E.g., A. H. Hastorf & H. Cantrill, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCH. 129 (1954); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7
COGNITIVE PSYCH. 560 (1975); Gary L. Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on
Human Performance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 275
(1980). Some eyewitness unreliability research dates back to 1908. See HuGo MUNSTERBERG, ON
THE WITNESS STAND 32-33 (1908).
115. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
116. The eyewitness research studies a real problem (mistaken identity) and uses variables that
could be changed, such as whether to give a cautionary instruction. E.g., Edith Greene, Judge's
Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 252,
262-66 (1988) (comparing different versions of cautionary instructions). Many studies express results
in terms judges can understand. David Egan et al., Eyewitness Identification: Photographs vs.
Live Models, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 199 (1977) (number of misidentifications). E.g., Glenn Sanders
& Dell Warnick, Some Conditions Maximizing Eyewitness Accuracy: A Learning-Memory Analogy,
8 CRIM. JUST. 395 (1980). See generally Ruback & Innes, supra note 8, at 683-84 (criteria for
apparent relevancy).
117. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Eyewitness on Trial, TRIAL, Oct. 1980, at 30; Fredric
D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreli-
ability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 974-89 (1977).
118. E.g., JAMES MARSHALL,. LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 41-81 (1966); Woocher, supra
note 117.
119. E.g., LoFTus, supra note 3, is cited in United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1182
(9th Cir. 1986) (Fergusen, J., dissenting) and Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 440 (4th Cir.
1986).
120. See Tanford, supra note 18, at 157-66.
121. E.g., State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Gunter, 554 A.2d 1356,
1360 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); see Joseph Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial
Identification Cases, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1409 (1986) (reviewing changes in law).
122. E.g., People v. Wright, 729 P.2d 280, 294-95 (Cal. 1987); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,
488-92 (Utah 1986).
123. See GARY L. WELLS & ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 336-64 (1984) (bibliography).
124. See supra notes 42-61.
125. E.g., Broeder, supra note 42; Robert R. Calo, Joint Trials, Spillover Pre)udice, and the
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on eyewitness unreliability than admonition ineffectiveness have appeared
in practitioner journals. 26
However, the difference in the quantity of research and publication
is likely to affect the extent to which social science influences law, not
whether it has any impact. A critical mass of literature is probably
needed for research to be adequately accessible to lawyers and judges.
However, the admonition literature meets that criterion: It has been
disseminated through law reviews, the A.B.A. Journal, and appellate
(often dissenting) opinions. 2 7 The fact that it has produced no legal
change at all, instead of producing a little change, suggests that the
research failed to satisfy a threshold condition. Because all four generally
accepted conditions are satisfied, there must be an additional threshold
condition that is necessary for social science to affect law.
Comparing eyewitness and admonition research, one difference stands
out that does not fit into any of the previously articulated conditions.
The admonition research is negative. It demonstrates that the law does
not work properly but fails to offer a feasible alternative that is com-
patible with trial procedures. On the other hand, the research on eyew-
itnesses is both negative and positive. It demonstrates that traditional
trial procedures are ineffective and also that two alternatives - either
using expert testimony or giving proper cautionary instructions - would
produce better trials.' 28
This suggests that purely negative empirical research is unlikely to
lead to law reform. Thus, the presence of constructive alternatives in
the research should be added as a fifth threshold condition. It is not
enough for social scientists to tell us that the legal system works imper-
fectly. They must be able to demonstrate that some realistic option works
better if they expect to have any impact on law reform.
V. Finding an Alternative
If social science expects to contribute to the reform of the admo-
nition rule, psychologists must find an alternative. Does another method
for handling prejudicial evidence exist that would be more effective than
admonishing jurors not to think about elephants? Psychological theory
suggests one that would be compatible with ordinary trial procedure:
Ineffectiveness of a Bare Limiting Instruction, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 21 (1985); Cornish & Sealy,
supra note 50.
126. Compare Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Powerful Eyewitness Testimony: Lessons From the
Research, TRIAL, Apr. 1988, at 64; Wayne Westling, Mistaken Identification, LITIG., Spring 1981,
at 48 (book review of Eyewitness Testimony) with Paul Marcotte, The Jury Will Disregard ...
But New Study Suggests That By Then It's Too Late, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1987, at 34; Jurors Unlikely
to Follow Judge's Order to Disregard Testimony, Study Shows, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 28,
1988, at 1.
127. E.g., State v. Honomichl, 410 N.W.2d 544, 550-53 (S.D. 1987) (Henderson, J., dissent-
ing); State v. Burton, 676 P.2d 975, 983-89 (Wash. 1984) (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
128. See Wells, supra note 4, at 61-62. Traditional procedure prohibited experts, gave no
cautionary instructions, or gave an instruction known as a Telfaire instruction. See United States
v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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forewarn jurors and obtain public commitments from them that they
will not misuse improper evidence.
The judge could initially forewarn jurors by instructing them that
lawyers or witnesses may try to persuade them with improper evidence
which they will be able to recognize by the judge's sustaining of an
objection. In some contexts, this kind of procedural forewarning has
been shown to be effective to immunize listeners against persuasion,
even when they do not know what the content of the improper infor-
mation will be. 129 A warning that attorneys may try to persuade them
through improper evidence may make jurors feel they are being manip-
ulated and may cause them to react against this loss of freedom - what
psychologists call reactance theory. 130 Jurors forewarned will be moti-
vated to actively counterargue against improper information.
Jurors' motivations to counterargue against improper information
will be reinforced if the jurors make public commitments to resist being
influenced by improper evidence. 3' The judge can ask each juror to
promise not to consider improper evidence to which objections are
sustained. Studies show that people will be more motivated to behave
in certain ways if they have some ego-involvement; i.e., if there are
personal consequences associated with deviant behavior. Public commit-
ments provide that personal interest and therefore confer resistance to
persuasion.12 The desired behavior is even more likely to occur if people
have to actively defend their commitments,' as jurors might during
deliberations.
The judge should explain that the judge and other jurors expect this
behavior, and that it would be a violation of the principles of a fair
trial to consider evidence to which an objection has been sustained. The
judge should then elicit individual, public commitments from each juror.
Public commitments are more effective than private promises, individual
commitments are better than group affirmations, and commitments
linked to personal values and people who are admired are made stronger.'3
Then, during the trial, objections to improper evidence could be
sustained but no contemporaneous admonition given. Sustaining the
objection should provide the cue that triggers reactance against the
information and motivates jurors to muster arguments against it. In the
final charge, the judge should remind jurors of the general rule and
129. See RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION 126-30
(1986); William J. McGuire, Attitudes and Attitude Change, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
263-64 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985).
130. See PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 129, at 129-30. See generally, SHARON S. BREHM &
JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981) (detailed
explanation of theory of reactance and its applications).
131. McGuire, supra note 129, at 263-64 (forewarning more effective if accompanied by initial
commitment).
132. PErrY & CAcIoPpo, supra note 129, at 81-82; Michael S. Pallak et al., Effect of
Commitment on Responsiveness to an Extreme Consonant Communication, 23 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 429 (1972).
133. See McGuire, supra note 129, at 293.
134. Id. at 293-94.
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their commitment to follow it. 13 Wolf and Montgomery's research
suggests this might be a more effective procedure than the current
practice of contemporaneous admonitions.' 36 Whether this promising
procedure will in fact reduce the prejudicial impact of evidence is
uncertain. Only future experimentation and empirical testing will answer
that question.
VI. Conclusion
Thirty years of empirical research demonstrates that admonishing
jurors to disregard or limit their use of prejudicial evidence is ineffective.
In some cases, admonitions only make things worse. This research has
been brought to the attention of the legal community but has produced
no measurable change in judicial behavior. Judges still give admonitions
and appellate courts still approve their use.
The failure of this body of social science to contribute in any way
to legal change cannot be explained by conventional theories on the
interaction between social science and law. The admonition research
meets the minimal criteria of apparent relevancy, accessibility, longevity,
and relative political neutrality. It satisfies many of the conditions
thought to increase the extent to which social research will affect law
because it coincides with many judges' intuitions, could help legitimate
politically difficult decisions reversing convictions, has been cited in a
number of appellate opinions, has been taught in law schools, is not
heavily statistical, and does not obviously conflict with faith or common
sense. A change in the rule, if applied prospectively, would not lead to
major political disruption. The law of admonitions appears to be a good
candidate for social science-based law reform.
The admonition rule should have changed, but it did not. This
suggests that some other threshold condition is necessary before social
science will contribute to changes in law. Comparing the admonition
research to more successful psycholegal collaborations, such as eyewitness
testimony, reveals one significant difference that is not accounted for
under conventional theory: the empirical research on admonitions is
purely negative. Nowhere in the social science literature is any better
alternative offered. Without that alternative, even if judges wanted to
change their practices, they would not know what new procedure to
adopt. Until psychologists demonstrate the superiority of a different
procedure, such as forewarning and obtaining commitments, the law is
unlikely to change.
135. The reminder serves as a second immunization against misuse of evidence during delib-
erations. Petty and Cacioppo doubt that warnings of persuasive intent act as rejection cues leading
people to discount a message without considering it, so that a warning after the fact would have
little effect on information already received. PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 130, at 126-27.
136. Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 46, at 216.
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